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ABSTRACT 
The growing hostility and division between Islam and “the West” comes at a time when 
the United States and our allies need more than ever to secure vital national interests in 
the Middle East, to include energy resources, regional stability, and the suppression of 
terrorism. Our dilemma is that dispatching troops to the region has only increased 
hostility and fed the Islamist propaganda mill while confirming in the minds of many 
Americans and our allied populations that intervention in these regions is a 
counterproductive waste of blood and treasure. The United States needs to reduce its 
military footprint but at the same time maintain the ability to back its diplomacy with 
muscle.  At present, our methods of securing our interests in the Middle East are confined 
to large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) occupied by rotational units of U.S. Army 
Combat troops and Marines with little cultural knowledge and an operational focus. 
These large American forces are supplemented by Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
programs that are primarily conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces and counter-terrorist 
strategies focused on covert operations aimed at eliminating High Value Targets 
(HVTs)—that is, the leadership of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations. One 
partial solution to the problem of underperforming indigenous forces and an over 
emphasis on HVTs could be to create an American Foreign Legion. The establishment of 
a permanent force recruited among non-U.S. citizens and led by American officers might 
offer a flexible tool to allow the U.S. military to secure American interests in the Middle 
East, while establishing a smaller, more politically acceptable American security 
footprint. However, the obstacles to the creation of such a force are significant, not the 
least of which they go against American traditions of a society of equal opportunity, and 
those of the U.S. military where all soldiers serve on the basis of equality of treatment 
and status. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM 
 The “Clash of Civilizations” between Islam and the Christian West dates from the 
rise of Islam from the seventh century. Islam spread through the Mediterranean world at 
Christian expense, followed by the Reconquista of Islamic lands in the Iberian and 
Balkan peninsulas that began in the ninth century. Although the Gulf War of 1991 found 
Muslim states fighting with the U.S.-led coalition, the proximity of “Christian” soldiers 
to Islam’s holiest sites in Saudi Arabia was seen by the most faithful as a desecration and 
revived tales of the Christian Crusades to retake the Holy Land. No surprise then, that 
even before the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent invasions by coalition 
forces of Afghanistan and Iraq, some in the Islamic world defined Muslim/Western 
relations as perpetually antagonistic, and believed Islamic and Western religions, values, 
institutions, and social mores endemically incompatible.  In 1996, Osama Bin Laden 
issued a fatwa (an Islamic religious ruling, a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law) 
denouncing the presence of “the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies” close 
to Mecca as an “aggression” against Islam. The “West” has reciprocated with a growing 
hostility to Muslim immigration in Europe and a growing anti-Islamic xenophobia in the 
United States, especially among the political Right, directed toward Muslims.1  
 This growing hostility and division between Islam and “the West” comes at a time 
when the United States and our allies need more than ever to secure vital national 
interests in the Middle East, to include energy resources, regional stability, and the 
suppression of terrorism. Our dilemma is that dispatching troops to the region has only 
increased hostility and fed the Islamist propaganda mill, while confirming in the minds of 
many Americans and our allied populations that intervention in these regions is a 
counterproductive waste of blood and treasure. The United States needs to reduce its 
military footprint but at the same time maintain the ability to back its diplomacy with 
muscle.  At present, our methods of securing our interests in the Middle East are confined 
                                                 
1 Frank Rich, “How Fox Betrayed Petraeus,” New York Times, August 22, 2010. 
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to large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) occupied by rotational units of U.S. Army 
Combat troops and Marines, with little cultural knowledge, and an operational focus. 
These large American forces are supplemented by Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
programs that are primarily conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces and counter-terrorist 
strategies focused on covert operations aimed at eliminating High Value Targets 
(HVTs)—that is, the leadership of Taliban and Al- Qaeda terrorist organizations.  
 SFA programs have their advantages but have also encountered problems. The 
difficulties with standing up effective units in the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the 
Afghan National Army are widely reported. The June 2010 report from the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) titled Actions Needed to Improve the 
Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments illustrated numerous failures of the 
SFA program within Afghanistan and highlights the many reasons why SFA programs 
often fail to achieve their desired results. After spending over 27 billion dollars on 
training, equipping, and sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), the 
SIGAR audit identified gross deficiencies and failures in the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) directed training programs.2 The shortcomings of the ANP unit 
in Baghlan-e Jadid were referenced as emblematic of the SFA’s systemic problems:  even 
though the unit was given the highest rating for an ANP unit, the audit team was not  
allowed to visit this unit because the area was “not secure” and “overrun with 
insurgents.” Why the unit was given a four-star rating was equally puzzling as, in the 
opinion of one of the ISAF staff officers, the Baghlan police force had “withered away to 
the point that it barely functions.”3  
 HVT programs also have their drawbacks, beginning with a history of 
questionable success. French counter-insurgency theorist David Galula considered 
“decapitation” of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) leadership a futile 
strategy:  
                                                 
2 John Brummet, “Actions needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” 
SIGAR Audit-10–11, June 29, 2010. 2. 
3 Ibid.,13. 
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Then, five top leaders of the rebellion, including Ben Bella, had been 
neatly caught during a flight from Rabat to Tunis, Their capture, I admit 
had little effect on the direction of the rebellion, because the movement 
was too loosely organized to crumble under such a blow. 4 
 In fact, decapitation produced a net negative effect on the direction of the 
rebellion from Paris’ perspective because it created a vacuum at the top of the 
organization that radicals surged to fill.5 The capture of the top FLN leadership was part 
of a broader French strategy to remove all spokesmen for the Muslim community, 
including leaders of organizations who advocated reform through legal means. In this 
way, the French removed or discredited moderate competition for leadership of the 
population at all levels, undermined prospects for political compromise, locked the 
French into a military solution to the rebellion, and drove the Muslim population into the 
arms of the radicals. 
 A second potential defect of a top-down HVT approach is that it assumes the 
removal of the leader will collapse the organization. While this may be true in some cases 
of very centralized insurgent or terrorist groups, it has proven less effective against more 
robust or decentralized organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 
(FARC) where decapitation leaves the organizational structure intact, allows a new leader 
to take charge, and causes the organization to fragment into smaller, less target-worthy 
cells from which it continues business as usual.  
 Third, a decapitation strategy may be anchored in the illusion that a single 
institution, service, or weapon system can solve a strategic problem. The current Predator 
Drone program bundles two such fallacies into a single intelligence/air power package. 
The idea that a well-crafted coup by an intelligence service can resolve a strategic issue 
has a long history. One such example occurred in 1984; the French Secret Services 
believed that blowing up the environmental group Greenpeace’s Rainbow Warrior in 
Auckland Harbor would end protests over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific,  
 
                                                 
4 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 141.  
5 Stephen T. Homer, Sibylle O.Crane, Counterinsurgency a Symposium April 16-20, 1962, (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand 1963, 2006), 13. 
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when, in fact, it only served to enflame them. This approach represented what British spy 
novelist John le Carré has called “the oldest trap in the trade,” the belief that the real 
world’s imperfections can be redressed by the secret world.6   
 The Predator Drone is also Douhet redux; we are simply revisiting the idea 
promoted by air power theorists like the Italian Giulio Douhet from the 1920s who 
believed prolonged, destructive ground combat could be avoided by targeting “soft” 
civilian targets with bombers.7  Nor is the idea of substituting air power for ground troops 
a new one even for Afghanistan—in the years following World War I, some British 
believed that their large inventory of surplus biplanes offered a cost-effective solution to 
imperial policing in general, and India’s North West Frontier with Afghanistan in 
particular. Although the Afghans protested British terror bombing of Afghan villages, 
airpower was declared the decisive weapon in the Third Anglo-Afghan War (May-
August 1919), to the point that the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard acting at 
the behest of economy minded Prime Minister Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, 
proposed policing from the air as a permanent solution to frontier control. Obviously, 
none of these gentlemen had ever flown over the Hindu Kush where dust storms, violent 
updrafts, and generally inclement weather focused pilots on the rudiments of self 
preservation to the neglect of monitoring tribal activities on the ground.8  
In our own day as in the past, the proposal that a person sitting in front of a video 
monitor in Las Vegas can be a decisive factor in a counter-insurgency campaign that 





                                                 
6 John le Carré, “Tinpots, Saviors, Lawyers, Spies,” New York Times, May 4, 1993. Quoted in Douglas 
Porch, The French Secret Services,(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1995), 456. 
7 David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter Paret (ed), The 
Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 624–47. 
8 David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939, (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 1919), 8–14. 
 5
issues along the Durand Line by simply pressing a button is attractive but delusional. But, 
at the time of writing, we seem to be relearning the lesson of the strategic limitations of 
airpower in Libya. 
 HVT programs undermine “population centric” or “hearts and minds” counter-
insurgency operational concepts, because they strain legal parameters of permissible 
activity, are criticized on moral grounds, and have been accused of causing significant 
collateral damage which undermines U.S. support. When they occur in cross-border 
environments, one has to question whether the tactical benefits outweigh the damage to 
international relations. When, for instance, former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe 
ordered a successful February 2008 attack on the camp of FARC “foreign minister” Raúl 
Reyes in Ecuador, he provoked a storm of protest in Latin America over the violation of 
“sovereign” territory of a neighboring state. While the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan has always been notional, and the insurgents certainly do not respect it, cross-
border drone or special forces attacks, whatever their tactical benefits, simply showcase 
the fragile legitimacy of the government in Islamabad, and enrage elements of Muslim 
opinion. The attempted car bombing of New York City’s Time Square was conducted by 
Faisal Shahzad as a reprisal for the U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan.9 Al Qaeda has already 
established terrorist attacks against civilians targets as Jus in Bello, and the continued use 
of this particularly unpopular method of attacking HVTs in sovereign nations will likely 
exacerbate the cycle of violence. 
 One partial solution to the problem of underperforming indigenous forces and an 
over emphasis on HVTs could be to create an American Foreign Legion. The 
establishment of a permanent force recruited among non-U.S. citizens and led by 
American officers might offer a flexible tool to allow the U.S. military to secure 
American interests in the Middle East, while establishing a smaller, more politically 
acceptable American security footprint.  
 
                                                 
9 Oxford Analytica, “Drones draw international law concerns,” OxResearch Daily Brief Service, 
August 2, 2010. 
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B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East is not politically 
feasible due to American security interest and long-term commitments with Middle 
Eastern governments. However, the creation of a “U.S. Foreign Legion,” a surrogate 
force led by Americans and composed of international volunteers, would provide the 
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander with another, perhaps more 
politically acceptable, unit to conduct contingency operations. A U.S. Foreign Legion 
would help to reduce the American military footprint in the Middle East, ease local fears 
of U.S. imperialistic intentions in a region with a memory of imperial domination, and 
possibly assuage the religious sensibilities of those who object to “Christian” soldiers 
near Muslim holy sites or even in Muslim lands. At the same time, it would be cost 
effective because it would reduce the exposure of U.S. troops to casualties, which might 
lengthen the tolerance of the U.S. public for military action followed by prolonged 
occupations. It would be a more discrete force, and with the right recruitment and in the 
right conditions, would not dominate and militarize foreign policy as our large-scale 
interventions now tend to do. 
Furthermore, at various times in the past, politicians and commentators have 
suggested that the United States create a foreign legion along the lines successfully used 
by France for almost two centuries as an expeditionary corps. Peter Schweizer has been a 
leading advocate for the establishment of an American Foreign Legion. In articles written 
for the New York Times and USA Today, Schweizer has called for the creation of an 
American Foreign Legion consisting of between eight and twenty thousand volunteers, 
with the French Foreign Legion being used as a model.10 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should the United States create an American Foreign Legion to secure vital 
national interests in the Middle East? 
                                                 
10 Peter Schweizer, “A foreign legion could answer USA’s military needs,” USA Today, March 25, 
2002; “All they Can Be, Except American,” New York Times, February 18, 2003. 
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D. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis will endeavor to explore the feasibility of creating such a force within 
the U.S. military.  First, it will explore the two models for a “non-national” force as they 
existed in the past or now exist: first, a “foreign legion” as currently exists in France and 
Spain made up of non-national volunteers; second, a “colonial” model once extensively 
used as “sovereignty” troops in European colonies. These “colonial” regiments were 
usually recruited from a single, often minority ethnic group, like the Gurkhas, who 
continue to exist as separate units in the modern-day British and Indian armies. The thesis 
will examine the strengths and weaknesses of each of these models. 
Next, this thesis will explore the applicability of both models to U.S. conditions. 
My hypothesis is that America’s tradition as a society “open” to immigrants who accept 
the American ideal, rather than one defined by a closed idea of “identity” based on 
culture, religion, and “blood” as in Europe, would exclude the “foreign legion” model. At 
present, the U.S. military accepts noncitizens and incorporates them into the ranks just 
like citizen volunteers. Therefore, it would require a change in the law excluding 
foreigners from service in regular units, as in France, to make the “foreign legion” model 
practical. There are also many practical administrative and discipline issues with creating 
a foreign corps, as the French have discovered. 
The “colonial” model has problems along the same lines as those of the “legion,” 
raising critical question such as: what groups may be tempted to join a U.S. Foreign 
Legion; what might be the political implications of using them in certain areas;  how 
would they be staffed; and what happens when or if the recruitment pool dried up? 
My initial hypothesis is that the creation of a “foreign legion” within a U.S. 
military framework is impractical, unnecessary, and redundant. First, the legal, 
administrative, political, and recruitment problems surrounding the creation a U.S. 
foreign legion may make the scheme impractical.  
Second, a U.S. Legion is unnecessary. The U.S. military has no shortage of 
citizen volunteers, often the lower economic strata from conservative states willing to 
assume the risks of deployment in exchange for the career benefits and adventure of 
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service. The tolerance of the U.S. public for these prolonged COIN (counter-insurgency) 
missions seems, if not inexhaustible, at lease substantial. Low intensity warfare avoids 
battles similar to Stalingrad, which might indicate the true casualty cost of engagement. 
Instead, the American public confronts only a dribble of casualties that the Bush-Cheney 
administration tried to obscure, while the “liberal” media like the PBS Newshour, the 
New York Times, and columnists such as Bob Herbert expose periodically in a respectful, 
low-key fashion as patriotic sacrifice. Proponents of intervention, even those like Tom 
Ricks who have written critically of Operation Iraqi Freedom, present “The Surge” as a 
resounding strategic success that has consecrated General Petraeus as the “new 
Conquistador of COIN.” Some skeptics suggest that Petraeus’ strategy may be to saturate 
an area like Marja with troops and report success there to lull public opinion into 
believing the progress throughout Afghanistan is more generalized than, in fact, is the 
case.11 The debate over the effectiveness of COIN appears so far to be confined to a 
narrow band of “specialists” inside the military and security related think tanks.12 But 
overall, in many circles it has become both unpatriotic and disrespectful to voice 
skepticism about the feasibility, strategic prospects, or methods of COIN-driven nation 
building.  Finally, the true financial costs of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been secreted in “supplemental,” off-budget spending bills.  In final analysis, the 
fact that the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were scarcely  discussed in the 2010 
mid-term elections appear to demonstrate that the American public considers both the 
human and financial costs of COIN to be acceptable within the national defense outlay.  
Third, a foreign legion is redundant, because, in effect, Washington has already 
created a foreign legion by outsourcing much of its SFA and security work to private 
contractors. This has created its own problems of discipline, accountability, and 
competition between state and private security services to the point where Afghan 
                                                 
11 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Some Skeptics Questioning Rosy Reports on War Zone,” New York Times, 8 
November 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/world/asia/08military.html?_r=1&ref=world. 
12 Sebastian L. v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, “An Actor-centric Theory of War. Understanding the 
Difference Between COIN and Counterinsurgency,” JFQ, issue 60, 1st quarter 2011, 14-18; For a more 
skeptical view, see Larry Goodson and Thomas H. Johnson, “Parallels with the Past – How the Soviets 
Lost in Afghanistan. How the Americans are Losing,” Foreign Relations Research Institute, April 2011. 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.goodson_johnson.afghanistan.html  
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President Hamid Karsai threatened to ban them, which provoked a Greek chorus of 
protests led by the U.S. State Department. Therefore, a U.S. Foreign Legion would only 
further muddle an already complex security environment, and probably meet stiff 
opposition from an entrenched private security lobby that would view a U.S. sponsored 
foreign legion as competition for recruits and an obstacle for securing contracts.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use secondary sources such as book, newspaper articles, and 
primary sources such as government publications and reports. 
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II. MODELS FOR AN AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGION 
 Historically, many nations have enlisted foreigners in their military forces. The 
Roman Empire was probably the most enthusiastic consumer of foreign forces. The 
Roman Legions were regularly augmented with an equal number of foreign forces to 
double their size and increase their effectiveness.13 The Roman’s use of foreign forces 
directed by loyal citizens, allowed a fairly small class of Romans to control a significant 
portion of the known world. Chinghis Khan enlisted his hordes and assured their 
logistical support among a diversity of tribes and local allies.14 Although Machiavelli 
believed the condottieri of sixteenth century Italy venal, inefficient, treacherous, and low 
class, foreign mercenaries were a common feature—if not the backbone—of most 
European armies through the French Revolution, not the least because monarchs feared 
arming their own potentially rebellious subjects.15  
The advent of modern, citizen armies made foreign mercenaries obsolete in 
Western Europe, although the persistence of Empires like those of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany until 1918 and Russia/USSR for far longer required the incorporation of a 
mosaic of national and ethnic minorities into imperial forces. The U.S. Army provided a 
first stop for many would be immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Wartime circumstances caused Heinrich Himmler’s Waffen SS to organize non-German 
contingents from 1942. Although the motive for enlistment was ostensibly ideological 
rather than venal, one can well imagine that coercion or survival played a large part in the 
decision to enlist.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Arther Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation (London: Thames and 
Hudson Ltd, 1986). 
14 H. Desmond Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China (New York: 
Octagon Books,1970). 
15 Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Peter Paret (ed), The Makers of 
Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 14–
15, 19, 26. 
 12
However, truly mercenary forces survived in the Foreign Legions of France and 
Spain, and in colonial units as Britain’s Ghurka Regiments. These two forces loosely 
defined as French/Spanish and the British/Colonial offer two contemporary 
organizational models.  
A. THE FRENCH OR SPANISH MODEL 
 The French Foreign Legion (FFL), formed in 1831, is undoubtedly the best 
known contemporary mercenary force, not the least because since the nineteenth century 
it has been the subject of many books, and subsequently films, that promote its image as a 
collection of romantic outcasts. All soldiers are volunteers led by French officers, both 
native born and naturalized.  That the French Foreign Legion has survived for almost two 
centuries comes as something of a surprise as it was created to solve what was thought to 
be a temporary immigration problem. “The corps was conceived as a provisional solution 
to a fleeting problem--” writes Legion historian Douglas Porch, “the migration of 
undesirable persons into France in the wake of revolutions in Germany, Poland, Italy and 
the Low Countries in 1830–1831.”16 The fact that, despite an unpromising debut, the FFL 
eventually emerged as an elite fighting force suggests superficially at least that the model 
may be worth replicating in the U.S. Army.  
 Although there have been significant changes in the recruiting, training, and 
basing of the French Foreign Legion, the unit still maintains a reputation as an elite 
fighting force. Today’s FFL recruiters are more selective than were their predecessors. 
Gone are the “anonymous names,” and the immunity that comes from starting anew. But 
the underlying philosophy and appeal of the Legion remain unchanged.  Allegiance to 
France is deemphasized in favor to loyalty to the Legion, as expressed in the motto: 
Legio Patria Nostra. After a background investigation, the recruit begins the rapid 
transition from civilian to legionnaire. The officers in the French Foreign Legion are still 
French Officers recruited from Saint Cry or other French Army formations.  
 As the French have learned, there are some inherent drawbacks with their legion 
model, the most obvious being linguistic issues among a polyglot soldiery. While French 
                                                 
16 Douglas Porch, What Ever Happened to the French Foreign Legion?, Military History Vol. 28: 
Issue 1, May, 2011, 28–35. 
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is the language of command, and an effort is made to make sure that legionnaires master 
a rudimentary military vocabulary, the prospects for misunderstandings and confusion 
abound. This is offset somewhat by enlisting Frenchmen. Although, officially, French 
citizens are forbidden from joining the FFL, they still make up roughly forty percent of 
the Legion, ensuring that loyalties to France remain, and helping to smooth out the 
linguistic challenges that routinely plague the FFL.17   
Incorporating Frenchmen in the ranks inoculates against the true “legionnaires 
disease”—desertion.  The problem of desertion is as old as the Legion itself. Despite the 
threat of draconian punishments, a stunted sense of loyalty among men who often enlist 
on a lark, the lack of social stigma attached to desertion, the fact that desertion has 
become institutionalized as a rite of passage to becoming a “true” legionnaire, and the 
temptation of frequent deployments and easy to reach borders have made it a problem 
impossible to stamp out, has lowered efficiency, and shaped legion life and consequently 
morale.  
B. THE BRITISH OR COLONIAL MODEL 
The British or Colonial Model is generally understood as the co-opting of a 
singular group based on ethnicity, religion, tribe, language, a combination of all, or some. 
The most illustrative model is the British use of Gurkhas, founded in 1816, and who 
continue to exist in both the modern British and Indian armies. 
The Treaty of Segauli, which ended the Anglo-Nepalese War in 1815, ceded to 
the British East India Company the right to recruit Himalayan tribesmen—known 
colloquially as Gurkhas—a concession that has persisted into the present day.18 This 
treaty has been amended over the years to specify numbers, pay scales, and pensions. But 
the basic agreement has survived for two centuries.   
During the early nineteenth century, the British were feverishly expanding their 
empire and becoming more reliant on utilizing colonial subjects to help maintain control 
                                                 
17 Douglas Porch, What Ever Happened to the French Foreign Legion?, Military History Vol. 28: 
Issue 1, May 2011, 28–35. 
18 Byron Farewell, The Gurkhas, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984) 31. 
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of their ever expanding empire. After fighting a war that lasted more than three years 
with the Nepalese, British commanders were amazed that these “mountain savages” 
generally followed the western rules of warfare. A British soldier assigned to the 87th 
Foot wrote of his experience fighting the Gurkhas: 
I never saw more steadiness or bravery exhibited in my life. Run they 
would not, and of death they seemed to have no fear, though their 
comrades were falling thick around them, for we were so near that every 
shot told.19 
After the independence of India, less than half of the Gurkha regiments stayed 
with the British and the rest became part of the Indian Army. This amazing simple 
arrangement even left the regimental numbering system in place with the British 
controlling the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 10th Gurkha Regiments with the remaining regiments 
becoming part of the Indian Army.20 
The linguistic issues and problems of desertion have never been an issue with the 
Gurkha Regiments. The lack of linguistic issues is logical, but the utter lack of desertions 
in the Gurkha regiments is noteworthy. The absence of Gurkha desertion is likely a result 
of a strong sense of loyalty to other Gurkhas and the incredible sense of pride Gurkhas 
place in loyalty to their Regiment. The absence of major issues within the Gurkha 
Regiments is likely more related to the incredible individual quality of the Gurkhas 
themselves, and does not necessarily apply to all colonial model foreign legions. The 
inherent threat of mutiny from a homogeneous group of foreign surrogates is the most 
obvious and potentially catastrophic threat of utilizing a colonial model. But unlike the 
FFL, which is a true multi-national mercenary force, Gurkha discipline is guaranteed by 
ethnic and even family ties, as well as by a sense of collective loyalty.   
This model of co-opting indigenous forces was also used by the United States 
Military, albeit on a smaller scale. The United States Army in the Philippines during the 
first half of the twentieth century was a colonial foreign legion. Filipino soldiers manned 
entire divisions commanded by American officers and swore oaths of loyalty to the 
                                                 
19 Byron Farewell, The Gurkhas, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984) 30. 
20 Ibid., 250. 
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United States. In Vietnam, United States Special Forces made extensive use of local 
tribes to assist with interdicting Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army advances into 
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The largest of these tribal groups were the 
Montagnards who became close allies with U.S. Forces in spite of their general dislike of 
the South Vietnamese people who they were ostensibly allied.  
It is likely the Colonial Model is the more efficient than the Foreign Legion 
model. But, the unique relationship that a colonial model requires precludes its use by the 
United States. The United States no longer enjoys a colonial relationship with any 
country, and the absence of a particular group of people from who we might draw recruits 
eliminates the colonial model a viable option. The changing nature of American foreign 
policy creates issues with establishing permanent alliances, and it is unlikely that any 
nation would allow us access to their population in a fashion similar to the British/Indian 
and Nepalese relationship. 
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III. WHAT MIGHT AN AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGION LOOK 
LIKE 
A. COMPOSITION 
The basic composition of an American Foreign Legion would likely mirror image 
conventional U.S. Army formations. Peter Schweizer recommends establishing a force of 
approximately 20,000 troops.21 This number would roughly translate to five brigade 
combat teams. Creating a foreign force of this size would be a monumental task. The 
establishment of an American Foreign Legion would have to be done incrementally and 
over an extended period of time. The precise number of Legionnaires necessary would, of 
course, change based on military, political, and monetary realities. 
The initial establishment of an American Foreign Legion would likely be limited 
to a battalion size organization. The basic model would be a large light infantry battalion, 
with very little staff and support functions. Initially U.S. Army personnel from Special 
Forces and light infantry units should be used to fill all leadership roles, from team 
leaders to battalion commanders. The initial requirement based on a battalion with four 
line companies would be approximately three hundred Americans consisting of two 
hundred and seventy noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and thirty commissioned 
officers. As in the French model, the requirement for NCOs would drop drastically once 
foreign volunteers gleaned enough experience to become junior leaders. Once the force 
matured it would likely only require the thirty commissioned officers and a similar 
number of senior NCOs. These sixty or so American leaders would be directing the 
actions of a unit numbering approximately 1075 soldiers.22 This force multiplication is 
the primary advantage to a surrogate force structure and should be expanded on whenever 
the organizational maturity allows it to be exploited.  
The primary functions of an American Foreign Legion would be low-intensity 
warfare, Peace Enforcement (PE) and counterinsurgency operations. These mission sets 
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primarily require light forces with the ability to operate fairly decentralized and, in most 
cases, for extended periods of time in austere conditions. The use of foreign volunteers 
would allow an American Foreign Legion to remain in place for extended, if not 
indefinite, periods. This coupled with a collectively broader worldview should make 
these surrogates more likely to focus on long term success rather than short term 
“victories.”  
B. RECRUITMENT 
Recruitment for an American Foreign Legion would likely be a straightforward 
task. The majority of the time and effort would be dedicated to filtering the pool of 
applications and attempting to identify any recruits that pose a security threat. In 2010, 
over sixteen million applications were received by the Department of States requesting a 
diversity visa—of these only approximately 50,000 will be awarded a visa.23 Even in a 
world that appears somewhat anti-American, every day more than 45,000 people 
worldwide apply to immigrate to the United States. If only 10 percent of these applicants 
were fit and willing to exchange military service for the possibility of citizenship, the 
personnel needs for a twenty thousand man American Foreign Legion could be met 
within a week. This number does not even consider the approximately thirteen million 
illegal immigrants living in the United States already. Each of these individuals would 
also be a potential recruit. An American Foreign Legion of approximately twenty 
thousand would require that just 1 out of 650 individuals currently living illegally in the 
United States be willing to serve in the American Foreign Legion. 
So, in terms of recruitment, a modified version of French Foreign Legion model 
of recruitment would be possible.  But, the United States has a much more open tradition 
of integrating immigrants than does France. This is particularly true in the French army, 
where, historically, foreign mercenaries were the mainstay of the despotic power of kings 
against the citizenry. The United States, with its tradition of posse comitatus, actually 
forbids the military to be used against citizens except in specified circumstances. 
                                                 
23 Diversity Visa Lottery 2011 (DV-2011) Results 
http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_4574.html. 
 19
Therefore, the United States does not have the same aversion to integrating foreigners 
into the ranks as does France. To do so would be to violate our image as a society open to 
all immigrants willing to embrace American values.  Nor is the Gurkha/colonial model an 
option as the United States is not historically linked to any particular country or ethnic 
groups that could become the focus for the colonial style of recruitment.  
C. BASING 
Basing for an American Foreign Legion could be problematic. Currently, the 
United States military is based at approximately 702 locations in over 130 countries.24  
Although this number is very high compared to other foreign militaries, a significant 
number of these basing agreements were post-World War II arrangements.  These 
agreements were made when the United States was free to implement policies that were 
favorable to the country due to the collapse of the Axis powers, and the generally world-
wide desire for stability. There has been a more recent precedent in basing Americans in 
foreign nations, including American forces stationed in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Uzbekistan and even the U.S. Navy headquartering its 5th fleet in Bahrain. Due to 
cultural sensitivities, most of the American forces were removed from Saudi Arabia by 
early 2000, and only time will tell as to the future of the Navy’s 5th fleet. Understanding 
the issues with basing should help American policy makers choose a location that would 
be advantageous to both the host nation and the American Foreign Legion. As the initial 
goals for the American Foreign Legion would be PE and Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC), 
the basing of the American Foreign Legion could initially fulfill a current Multi-National 
Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping operation. One of the most feasible is the 
peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. 
The basing of the American Foreign Legion in the Sinai would have some 
advantages over other viable options, in that the American Foreign Legion would be 
immediately put into an operational role, albeit one with fairly low risks and 
responsibility. The facilities in the Sinai are fairly well established, and could be quickly 
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expanded for training forces. The austere nature of the area would assist with deterring 
possible deserters while allowing U.S. and indigenous personnel to focus on training with 
limited distractions. Basing in the Sinai would also allow for rapid deployment 
throughout the Middle East and northern Africa. 
The basing of the American Foreign Legion in the Kurdish controlled area of Iraq 
is also another possible option. This decision would likely be greeted by the Kurdish 
population very favorably. The Kurdish people have regularly expressed interest in 
having a permanent American presence in Kurdistan. Their belief is that if the U.S. 
military is stationed there the central Iraqi government would never again be able to 
commit acts of genocide against the Kurdish minority. The basing of the AFL on Iraq soil 
would also allow the American Foreign Legion to quickly deploy to areas throughout the 
Middle East. The presence of Americans in Iraq indefinitely would likely be a source of 
aggravation for the Shia majority and meet with mixed opinion from the Sunnis. On one 
hand it might lessen their concerns about Iranian influence in the internal politics of Iraq, 
but it still may be viewed as a threat to their sovereignty. 
D. POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES TO ESTABLISHING AN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN LEGION 
1. Infusion of Cultural and Linguistic Experts 
It should come as no surprise that most American soldiers do not speak a foreign 
language, nor are they generally informed as to the cultural norms in the areas in which 
they are deployed. The lack of foreign language skills and cultural experts has been an 
obvious shortcoming since the beginning of the global war on terrorism. In 2005, the 
secretary of Defense issued directive number 5160.41E. The directive consolidated 
executive authorities for foreign language training, defined the term “regional experts,” 
and made changes in the command structure. But like most directives, it did nothing to 
solve the operational problem of too few linguists.25 
The lack of foreign language skills in the United States Department of Defense is 
directly linked to the military’s recruiting pool. Most Americans do not speak a foreign 
                                                 
25 DoD directive 5160.41E October 21, 2005, amended May 27, 2010. 
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language. Out of 360 million Americans, only 45 million have foreign language skills, 
with almost 30 million of those speaking Spanish.26 The lack of linguistic and cultural 
skills is something that is not likely to change anytime in the foreseeable future. As 
American schools continue to see funding shortfalls, the teaching of foreign languages, 
along with other elective programs, will continue to be reduced in order for schools to 
close their budget shortfalls. 
If the United States Department of Defense were able to expand their recruiting 
pool throughout the world, it would obviously be able to recruit and retain linguistic and 
cultural experts. This worldwide recruitment would not only allow the DoD to have a 
steady supply of linguistics, but would also establish a system that could be used to 
dramatically increase the number of linguists recruited from certain regions during a 
crisis. 
A partial solution for the lack of linguistic and cultural experts would be the 
creation of an American Foreign Legion. An American Foreign Legion would 
immediately add a significant amount of language and cultural expertise to the 
Department of Defense. Once the Legion was established, foreign language needs could 
be easily filled with focused recruitment in particular regions.  
Members of the American Foreign Legion could also be used to train and advise 
American forces deploying overseas. Individuals recruited from remote regions of the 
world could be used as a valuable source of information and, in some cases, even be used 
as guides for other American units. The cooperation of an American Foreign Legion and 
other American forces could create an exceptionally effective tool to deal with America’s 
“Savage Wars of Peace.” 
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2. Forward Deployed Forces That Never Need to “Redeploy” 
The constant deployment and redeployment of American forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have created numerous problems. These problems range in scale from a 
failure to create a national level strategic plan, to individual soldiers not understanding 
basic cultural norms.  
It has been said that we did not fight the Vietnam War for 11 years; we fought 
eleven, one-year-long wars in Vietnam. This assertion was centered on the one year long 
individual rotations that were the standard measure of service during the Vietnam 
conflict. Since the American failure in Vietnam, military and civilian leaders have been 
imbued with the idea that the American military will never be involved in “another 
Vietnam.” Military leaders and historians have often blamed the “politics of the war” for 
the ultimate outcome instead of focusing on the systematic military failures. That being 
said, one of the most often cited military issues was the practice of deploying individuals, 
instead of cohesive units, to Vietnam.. The lesson “learned” was individual deployments 
were bad, and unit deployments were necessarily better (but perhaps not sufficient for 
success). Few would argue with the concept that unit deployments are far better than 
individual augmentation, but the problem associated with the one year rotations was 
likely much more significant than is generally understood.  
Although anecdotal, the fact that the United States military faces many of the 
same issues caused by constant rotation in Iraq and Afghanistan as they did in Vietnam 
indicates the rotational problem is far from solved. In laying out the rotation plan for 
Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) the acting Army Chief of Staff GEN John Keane 
announced: 
…we want to provide the combatant commander, General Abizaid, the 
force he needs to decisively defeat those elements that threaten security in 
Iraq, and allowing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to meet its 
objectives. We want to: instill predictability in the force by developing a 
force rotation plan with an intended Iraq tour length of up to 12 months. 
Use active component forces from all services, including support forces, to 
the extent possible, recognizing the majority of these forces are going to 
come from the United States Army….Use Reserve volunteers and Reserve 
component forces not recently mobilized, to balance deployment stress 
 23
across the force. Craft a rotation plan to balance risk across other potential 
contingencies. Eliminate or reduce in scope exercises and force 
commitments that would further stress the force without contributing 
significantly to the GWOT and OIF. Further seek to internationalize the 
force. Support the CPA to rapidly develop the police force, Iraqi civil 
defense force and the new Iraqi army to transition the bulk of security 
tasks to these forces as quickly as possible. Use contractors, when possible 
to provide logistics support, training support and other functions.27  
Like many inside and outside the military, it is likely that GEN Keane did not 
anticipate that the Iraq War was going to last more than eight years. Therefore, there was 
little effort put forth determining the negative aspect of constant troop rotations. The 
establishment of tour lengths up to twelve months greatly limited the flexibility of theater 
commanders and ultimately had to be suspended in order for “The Surge” in Iraq to be 
successful. 
The problems created by a rotational army are numerous, and the impacts are 
woefully under-analyzed and appreciated. These problems range from the routine 
logistical issues in transporting Soldiers and Marines thousands of miles every six months 
(for most Marine units) or every year (for most Army units) to lack of situational 
awareness when conducting operations. These unit rotation requirements coupled with a 
Rest and Relaxation (R&R) leave program consume the majority of Rotary and Fixed 
wing lift assets used in theater.  
The most significant aspect of short troop deployments is the lack of continuity in 
operations. In some instances this could manifest itself in a failure to identify targets and 
understand terrorist networks, or simply not knowing dangerous areas to avoid. In other 
cases, short deployments can lead to a fundamental lack of understanding of the cultural 
and ethnic divisions that are prevalent throughout a unit’s area of operations. In either 
case, the results often have proven fatal to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Most of the problems associated with constant troop rotations could be resolved 
with the establishment of an American Foreign Legion. A major advantage to using  
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foreign born troops would be their willingness to serve overseas for the vast majority of 
their time in service. In essence, a Foreign Legion would deploy at the outset of hostility 
and never redeploy until the conflict had ceased.   
3. Cost Effective Option 
In their exhaustively researched book, Stiglitz and Bilmes claim the total cost of 
the war in Iraq to the United States will be approximately three trillion dollars 
($3,000,000,000,000.00).28 With cost in inflation adjusted, this will make the Iraq 
conflict cost more than any other war the United States has participated in except World 
War II, which is estimated to have cost the United States approximately five trillion 
inflation adjusted dollars. The monetary cost of the Iraq War is especially disconcerting 
when considering the predicted cost of the Iraq War. The Secretary of Defense and the 
Pentagon budget office estimated that the war would cost fifty to sixty million dollars. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that postwar reconstruction could 
pay for itself through increased oil revenue.29 These overly optimistic numbers were 
clearly based on the idea that the war would be short and cheap. The belief that wars can 
be accomplished in this manner is not new, but the relative cost of these “brushfire wars” 
is most certainly escalating.  
A significant portion of the money the United States spends on the war in Iraq is 
committed to personnel, both through direct and indirect compensation (salary and robust 
benefits) and also the cost associated with supporting an American soldier overseas. Both 
of these costs would be greatly reduced with the establishment of an American Foreign 
Legion. Currently, the average monthly salary for a soldier in the Iraq army is between 
$450–$550 United States Dollars (USD). The average payment for third country 
nationals (TCNs) providing security in Iraq is between $700–$900 USD. The fact that 
thousands of people apply for these jobs every day, and in some cases have to bribe 
officials just to compete for these jobs, indicates that the current pay scale would likely 
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29 Ibid., 7. 
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be acceptable to an American Foreign Legion recruit. The simple reduction in wages 
would make an American Foreign Legion approximately one third the cost of a similar 
American unit. If the savings associated with the reduction in indirect benefits were 
included, the cost saving would be even more significant.  
Although the cost savings associated with reduced personnel expenditures would 
be significant, they would likely pale in comparison to the cost savings in logistical 
support. The establishment of the all volunteer force in the United States created an 
environment where expectations of support and relative comfort of American troops was 
greatly increased. The practice of providing American style living conditions for troops 
deployed in combat theaters has contributed significantly to the overall cost of war. An 
American Foreign Legion would be much easier and cheaper to support logistically, and 
because there would be no expectation of the American standard of living there would be 
little negative effect on the legionnaire’s morale. 
4. AFL Can Greatly Reduce the “Contractor Army” 
In 2007, the United States government had more than 180,000 contractors on its 
payroll in Iraq in support of less than 160,000 U.S. uniformed members of the military.30 
Although the use of contractors is nothing new to military conflict, the scope and cost of 
this unregulated army is something entirely different. Allison Stranger identifies four 
factors that led to unprecedented rise in the United States reliance on private contractors;  
Four factors intrinsic to the Department of Defense would conspire with 
the imperatives of globalization to transform the American approach to 
war in the 1990s. The first was the 1922 decision by the Navy and the War 
Departments to discontinue building ships and planes themselves, which 
launched the military’s romance with the private sector. Second, the shift 
from a conscripted to an all-volunteer military force after Vietnam meant 
that the Pentagon had to provide a range of new services (such as four 
flavors of ice cream for our troops stationed in Iraq) to fill its ranks; many 
of these services required expanding contracting. Third, during the Cold 
War, America’s strategic imperative had been to match the quantity of 
Soviet weaponry with the quality of the American arsenal, an effort that 
was thought to be enhanced by privatization’s efficiency. Finally, because  
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government pay scales meant that the Pentagon could not match the 
salaries available in the private sector to the best men and women, it 
resorted to contracting to draw on top talent.31 
 If Dr. Stranger is correct, the use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) is 
nothing new, but the pace and level in which the United States is currently utilizing these 
PMCs is a dramatic shift. The American contractor has certainly expanded the services 
available to Americans serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the presence of these legally 
ambiguous individuals has also been the cause of numerous, significant issues within 
these combat theaters. In March 2004, four contractors working for the infamous security 
company Blackwater (now renamed Xe, because Blackwater was thrown out of Iraq after 
the 2007 Nisour square massacre) were killed in an ambush and their bodies hanged from 
the main bridge over the Euphrates River. The attack and desecration of these four 
contractors was a significant factor in the decision to “retake” the town of Fallujah, 
culminating in what became known as the first battle of Fallujah. During the course of 
this operation, over fifty American troops were killed along with over 400 wounded; the 
insurgent and civilian casualties were estimated to be between six hundred and four 
thousand. Although it is likely that the Battle of Fallujah would have taken place without 
the death of these four contractors, the Marines and Soldiers that participated in the battle 
would have had more time and resources to plan their operations, possibly reducing both 
the friendly and civilian casualties.  
 Recently there has been a reduction in support of these private military 
companies, and more generally the “Rumsfeld Doctrine,” which was summarized in an 
article he wrote for Foreign Affairs. Rumsfeld states, “We must promote a more 
entrepreneurial approach: one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive and to 
behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists.”32 The reduction of 
support for these Private Military Companies is likely caused by the outrages associated 
with these PMCs and the excessive and often fraudulent cost associated with the services 
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they provide.33 The fact that most of these PMCs regularly use foreign nationals to 
provide security and other services does not appear to be a significant issue with the 
American public. 
 The growing unpopularity of these PMCs, coupled with an apparent acceptance of 
foreign nationals currently providing security assistance to American soldiers overseas, 
could indicate that the establishment of an American Foreign Legion is a viable option. 
American Legionnaires could greatly reduce the need for PMCs that primarily focus on 
security and nontechnical support for the DoD. Furthermore, the American Foreign 
Legion would be a much cheaper option than using PMCs. These American Legionnaires 
would never be paid five times the amount that an American soldier currently makes. An 
American Foreign Legion would also have another major advantage over the use of 
PMCs; all American Legionnaires would fall under the Uniformed Code of Military 
Justice. This would eliminate a major source of national embarrassment, namely the 
inability or unwillingness of the United States government to hold private contractors 
accountable for their actions committed in conflict zones. These actions include 
Blackwater guards murdering unarmed women and children in Baghdad, Halliburton 
employees raping their own in Iraq, or Paravant LLC trainers killing civilians in 
Afghanistan. The actions by these PMCs, coupled with a complete lack of effective 
oversight of these PMCs by the United States government, has had catastrophic effects on 
building positive relations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An American Foreign Legion could 
amount to the best of both worlds. It could be simultaneous professional, law abiding, 
and cost effective. 
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IV. OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING AN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
LEGION 
There would be numerous obstacles to establishing an American Foreign Legion. 
Some of these barriers would be institutional, and others would be philosophical. Some 
of the potential obstacles include a possible expansion of the civil-military gap or even a 
more militaristic American foreign policy. Other issues that may arise from establishing 
this surrogate force could be the need to modify the current U.S. military policies that 
allow legal immigrants to serve in the U.S. Armed forces. It is also possible that the 
traditional American view of citizenship is wholly incompatible with the idea of creating 
an American Foreign Legion. There are also more practical issues in regard to the 
manning and recruiting of a Foreign Legion. One of the most overarching issues would 
be the possibility that an American Foreign Legion would be viewed by the international 
community as a shift from American arrogance to American colonialism.  
A. CIVIL-MILITARY GAP 
It almost definitely would be argued that creating an American Foreign Legion 
would expand the civil-military gap within the United States. For example, Johnson and 
Metz argue: 
Major adjustments in civil-military relations are never easy. The heart of 
the problem is an enduring tension: To succeed at warfighting, the military 
must be distinct in values, attitudes, procedures, and organization but 
must, at the same time represent American society.34  
In order to determine the possible effect of an American Foreign Legion on 
expanding the existing civil-military gap, one must first determine how large the current 
civil-military gap is. After conducting extensive research for their book Choosing your 
Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, Peter Feaver and 
Christopher Gelpi write:  
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Our findings indicate that civilian and military elites differ significantly in 
terms of their foreign policy priorities and the extent to which they are 
willing to place constraints on the implementation of military operations. 
We find little civil-military gap, however, with regard to the importance of 
military tools to achieve various foreign policy goals.35 
The apparent civil-military gap in foreign policy priorities would likely not 
surprise any American citizen, but the lack of a civil-military-gap in regard to the 
importance of the military in achieving foreign policy goals may be surprising. This fact 
may lend support to those who believe an American Foreign Legion is a viable option, 
because it would in their view make the military a more efficient tool of foreign policy.  
The idea of the civil-military gap has been written about by many throughout 
history including Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The more recent American focused 
works include Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer. Although 
many debate the degree and importance of the civil-military gap, few challenge its 
existence.  
Morris Janowitz’s basic premise in The Professional Soldier is that by ensuring 
the military and civilian world converged in regard to social norms it will assist with 
maintaining balance between the civilian and military leadership. His support of the use 
of conscription and reliance on the Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) to supply the 
bulk of the officer core would ensure that the military and civilian populations would be 
similar enough to ensure continued civilian control of the military through shared 
“civilian” values.36 Janowitz’s model is substantially similar to the “citizen soldier” 
model that has been considered the standard since the revolution.  
Some academic and military leaders have argued that this model was rendered 
obsolete with the end of the draft in 1974. Elliot Cohen has been the most vocal in his 
insistence that the American citizen soldier has disappeared. In his aptly titled article 
Twilight of the Citizen Soldier, Cohen writes: 
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There are various possible explanations for the persistence of the ideal of 
the citizen-soldier years after his disappearance as a real phenomenon. We 
may have here the lag inevitable as a generation that grew up with one 
powerful and evocative reality is unwilling to set it aside. It is possible that 
the notion of the citizen-soldier is somehow rooted deeply in the nature of 
democracy itself. Conceivably, as well, Americans may be unwilling to 
confront in a direct way the consequences of having a large and powerful 
military-the military, after all, that polices the world-which is not 
composed of citizen-soldiers.37 
 If Cohen is to be believed, and in fact the citizen soldier is a relic of the past,   
then  Janowitz’s model of minimizing the civil-military gap by maintaining the citizen 
soldier model may  have become less relevant in an era of the professional forces—
assuming that “professional” military values are seen as antithetical to “civilian” 
priorities.  
 This leaves us with Huntington’s theory of “objective civilian control” whose 
basic premise is that the loyalty of a professional military is guaranteed by the fact that its 
professional value system constrains its political ambitions. The civilian leadership in 
turn respects military professionalism because it values an effective fighting force 
Huntington states in his opening chapter that: “The modern officer corps is a professional 
body and the modern officer a professional man. This is, perhaps the most fundamental 
thesis of this book.”38 Although many academics have argued against Huntington’s 
theory since it was first published in 1957, it has stood the test of time.  
 The primary arguments against the Huntington model are twofold. The first is that 
conscription would require a foreign policy that is supported by the American people; the 
establishment of an American Foreign Legion would likely make implementing a more 
unpalatable foreign policy possible. The second general objection to Huntington’s model 
is the segregation of the U.S. military from the civilian population. The segregation and 
the growing divide in “values” would only be exasperated by a group of foreign 
mercenaries, who have no tie to the American society except of the professional cadre 
directing their actions.   
                                                 
37  Eliot A.Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier” Parameters, 31 (Summer 2001): 27. 
38 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 7. 
 32
 If one were to look objectively at the United States military today, it is clearly not 
based on a citizen-soldier model as traditionally defined. Since the end of the draft in 
1974, the United States has participated in major conflicts in Panama, the First Gulf War, 
Somalia, peace keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, the war in Afghanistan, and 
the second war in Iraq. The only people who served, or are still serving in these conflicts, 
are individuals that volunteered to join a professional military organization.  
Currently, civil-military relations in the United States appear to be relatively 
friction-free since the creation of the all volunteer military. There is little support for a 
reinstitution of conscription within the military or civilian leadership. And according to 
Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, there is a minimal civil-military gap in regard to 
operational decisions made by military commanders.39 If all of this holds true, the 
establishment of an American Foreign Legion may not have a significant effect on the 
civil-military gap, if indeed it is viewed as an operational issue. Some similarities could 
be drawn from the marginal support that private military contracting has seen since the 
American peace enforcing operations in the former Yugoslavia republic. Most Americans 
do not particularly like the idea of private military companies but have viewed them as a 
necessary evil to fill in capability gaps that exist in the U.S. Military. However, the 
pendulum of support has been shifting away from these private military contractors since 
early in the second Iraq War.40 
The effect on the civil-military gap by the establishment of an American Foreign 
Legion would largely be determined by how the American public viewed an American 
Foreign Legion. Some would surely argue that an American Foreign Legion is simply an 
operational element of the United States military, not significantly different that a regular 
infantry brigade. Others would undoubtedly argue that an American Foreign Legion is a 
dramatic shift in domestic and foreign policy and therefore would expand the civil- 
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military gap. Of course we cannot guarantee which way an American Foreign Legion 
would be portrayed, but it would likely fall somewhere in between the two landing closer 
to an operational decision made by military commanders.  
B. MILITARIZING FOREIGN POLICY 
Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with 
military power. The global military supremacy that the United States 
presently enjoys – and is bent on perpetuating – has become central to our 
national identity. More than America’s matchless material abundance or 
even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation’s arsenal of high-tech 
weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify 
who we are and what we stand for.41 
While Andrew Bacevich’s 2005 statement may have lost some of its cogency in 
the intervening years, many domestic and international foreign policy experts believe that 
American foreign policy has already become overly militarized.42 The creation of an 
American Foreign Legion would undoubtedly risk further promoting that perception. The 
United States military currently has over 200,000 troops deployed in support of 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, Philippines and the Horn of Africa. This number 
represents a significant portion of the United States Armed Forces. The presence of 
American troops stationed overseas dates predominately from the beginning of the Cold 
War.  
 Currently, the United States Department of Defense divides the world into 
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). These commands are led by a four star 
general or admiral and are essentially responsible for any military operations in that 
sphere. The idea of breaking the world into combatant commands is a uniquely American 
concept and is not well received by many nations. Currently, two of these GCCs, 
USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM, are involved in shooting wars in Afghanistan and 
Libya, respectively, while the rest are constantly preparing for a major regional 
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contingency. This omni-present American policy has certainly assisted with crafting a 
more militarized foreign policy, and is much maligned throughout the world. Regional ill 
will manifested itself most recently when, after establishing USAFRICOM, the 
Department of Defense was unable to acquire permission to locate their command 
anywhere on the continent of Africa even after offering significant financial incentives to 
any host country that would accept it.  
 The GCCs, which possess capabilities that far exceed those of the State 
Department, offer another indication of an increasingly militarized American Foreign 
Policy. The fact that we are currently engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Libya is another indicator that, for good or evil, the military option remains central to 
the conduct of American Foreign Policy. The establishment of an American Foreign 
Legion would undoubtedly be opposed by some as another step in liberating the 
executive branch to wield the military option without fear of a domestic political 
backlash caused by the potential for U.S. casualties.  
C. AMERICAN VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP 
The American view of citizenship is a fairly broad idea that cannot be exactly 
defined. In his paper, Roger Smith advances a number of generally held ideas. One he 
defines loosely as the Liberal citizen is summed up by President Wilson: 
President Woodrow Wilson articulated it deftly in a 1915 address to newly 
naturalized citizens, who had just sworn allegiance to the United States. 
Wilson told the new Americans that they had vowed loyalty "to no one," 
only to "a great ideal, to a great body of principles, to a great hope of the 
human race." He urged them to think of America, but to "think first of 
humanity," so as not to divide people into nationalistic "jealous camps."43 
Another description has been presented by Judtih Shklar’s book on American 
citizenship: 
The dignity of work and of personal achievement, and the contempt for 
aristocratic idleness, have since Colonial times been an important part of 
American civic self-identification. The opportunity to work and be paid an 
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earned reward for one’s labor was a social right, because it was the 
primary source of public respect….citizenship must always refer primarily 
to nationality.44 
The general notion of personal achievement and the right of self determination is 
the cornerstone of American citizenship, and it is in contrast to the more European 
version of citizenship as a birthright having more to do with blood, religion, language and 
ethnicity.  
The relative openness of the United States and our historical reluctance—not least 
in the U.S. military—to segregate foreign nations into separate units makes the prospect 
of having a U.S. foreign legion seem at least paradoxical, if not in contradiction to our 
basic principles. It is probable that some Americans would object to the idea just as a 
matter of principle, while others might liken it to indentured servitude. America was 
founded and nourished by immigrants, many from poor lands who were willing to 
perform menial jobs in return for the prospect that they or their descendants could 
prosper. A trip today to any agricultural destination and the overwhelming presence of 
Latin American workers illustrates this point just as in previous generations a trip to a 
coal mine or steel mill would have revealed the preponderance of other immigrant 
groups.  
The American inclusionary view of citizenship and current and past U.S. military 
practice that incorporates potential immigrants into regular units may make the idea of an 
American Foreign Legion unpalatable to some. Others, however, may conclude that a 
U.S. Legion falls into the category of an entry-level job normally assumed by 
immigrants, and as a reasonable way for a foreign national to prove his or her allegiance 
to the United States.  
D. CURRENT U.S. POLICIES ON NONCITIZENS IN THE MILITARY 
Currently, there are approximately 35,000 noncitizens serving in the United States 
Armed Forces. In 2005, the Navy had approximately 15,880 noncitizen Sailors, the 
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Marine Corp had 6,440 noncitizen Marines, the Army had 5,590 noncitizen Soldiers, and 
the Air Force had 3,056 noncitizen Airmen.45  
The practice of foreign citizens enlisting in the United States military is nothing 
new. During the entire history of the United States, noncitizens have been allowed in 
some capacity to serve in the United States Armed Forces. This policy has allowed the 
U.S. military to recruit linguistic and area expertise from native populations. The policy 
of recruiting noncitizens has also allowed the U.S. military significantly to expand its 
recruiting pool.  
The current policy of recruiting noncitizens does require that the individual be a 
Legal Permanent Resident (LPR). Non-citizen volunteers cannot have a temporary 
residency visa, nor can they be an illegal-immigrant. Because census data does not 
distinguish between each of the types of visas, and the because the illicit nature of illegal 
immigration makes exact numbers difficult to determine, the census has estimated that 
there are approximately 1.5 million LPRs living in the United States between 18- and 24-
years old. Considering the total recruiting goal of the U.S. military is less than 200,000, 
the high number of available LPRs is significant.46  
It is unlikely that the United States will ever openly accept illegal immigrants 
serving in the United States Armed Forces. The recent failure of the Development, Relief 
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) act in the United States Congress only serves 
to illustrate that point.47  
If an American Foreign Legion were established, the current policy on noncitizens 
serving in the United States Armed Forces could stay the same. An American Foreign 
Legion would be prohibited from recruiting LPRs and American citizens in order  
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to ensure that the current Armed Forces recruiting pool is not reduced. This fairly simple 
policy would ensure that there was no competition for recruits between the U.S. Armed 
Forces and the AFL. 
E. APPEARANCE OF IMPERIALISM/COLONIALISM 
Perhaps the most unpalatable aspect of an American Foreign Legion would be the 
appearance of colonialism. History shows that foreign forces were often used as the tools 
of colonial powers. The French Foreign Legion was central in attempting to maintain 
control of France’s possessions in North Africa and Indochina. The French Foreign 
Legion was also “given away” to Spain in 1835. It also was considered as a stay-behind 
force in both Mexico in 1867 and Algeria in 1960.48 The British used the Gurkahs in 
Malaya, India, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  
The association of colonialism with these surrogate forces is a result of these 
forces being actively used to extend the reach of colonial powers. Often these foreign 
forces were the ones most encountered by indigenous populations. This was primarily 
because of the foreign forces’ proximity to the local population and the propensity of 
colonial powers to garrison surrogate forces at the limits of empire. In the absence of 
surrogate forces, the regular armed forces of the colonial country would become more 
closely associated with colonialism, much in the way many people (particularly in the 
Arab world) view the United States military today.49 
 The appearance of colonialism is obviously an important aspect when considering 
establishing a surrogate fighting force. It is probable that the stigma of colonialism is 
intertwined with foreign legions. It is also possible that disentangling the two could be 
insurmountable. The association of the colonialism and surrogate forces would likely be 
used by anyone to discredit the idea of establishing an American Foreign Legion. But if  
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the world already views the United States as an imperial power and the U.S. military as 
an occupying Roman Legion, then the colonial image of a potential American Foreign 
legion may by a mute point. 
F. U.S. MANNING OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGION 
Providing U.S. military personnel to man a foreign legion would be a difficult 
task. Some of the initial issues would be identifying who would be eligible to serve in the 
foreign legion. There would of course be resistance from any unit that felt the foreign 
legion was taking their top talent. The requirement to live in an austere location for 
periods of up to five years may make the recruiting pool relatively small. The 
requirement to live and work with such a diverse international group would also limit the 
number of applicants. Another obstacle to manning an American Foreign Legion would 
be the perceived impact on individual careers.  
Most of the U.S. manning for an American Foreign Legion would likely come 
from The United States Special Operations Command more specifically United States 
Army Special Forces (USSF). USSF conduct the vast majority of Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) training with allied nations throughout the world. This vast experience and 
integrated language and cultural expertise make USSF the most logical choice. USSF 
could not fill the manning requirements of an American Foreign Legion without rapid 
growth (which is unlikely due the recent increase in USSF). The establishment of an 
American Foreign Legion would also require support from the convention side of the 
U.S. Army or the U.S. Marine Corp. Although support from the U.S. Marine Corps could 
infuse good leaders and different institutional norms, it is extremely unlikely the U.S. 
Marine Corp leadership would support an American Foreign Legion. Marine Corp 
leadership just recently assigned personnel to Special Operations Command and 
generally view the integrity of Marine Corp units as sacrosanct. This leaves the 
conventional side of the U.S. Army as a potential recruiting source. The proposed light 
infantry structure of the American Foreign Legion would further limit the recruiting pool 
to infantry qualified Commissioned and Non Commissioned Officers (NCO).  
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If the American Foreign Legion recruited junior leaders from U.S. Army Infantry 
units, a few problems may arise. The first would be the time honored practice of “passing 
the trash.” The practice of passing lesser quality soldiers to other units is a practice that 
no unit will admit to, but every unit does on a regular basis. This practice could be 
minimized by establishing a selection and evaluation process for individuals wishing to 
serve in an American Foreign Legion. Another common occurrence when establishing a 
new “elite” unit within an organization is the siphoning of top talent. Again this problem 
can be mitigated by ensuring the widest possible recruiting pool and limiting the number 
of individuals selected from any individual unit. By ensuring that every potential 
American Foreign Legion leader was fully aware of the austere nature of his assignment, 
unqualified individuals would likely simply opt-out of joining the AFL.  
A significant and possible insurmountable issue would be establishing an 
approved American Foreign Legion career path for Officers and Non Commissioned 
Officers. The current Army promotion system is based on an individual officer or NCO 
following a tightly defined career path. The “gates” that one must pass through are 
defined as Key and Developmental (KD) positions. Currently these are a narrowly 
defined set of jobs that consume that vast majority of an individual’s time in operational 
units. An individual that fails to perform satisfactory at each rank in a KD position will 
most likely not be promoted to his or her next rank. This institutional hurdle is more 
problematic than just creating KD positions within the American Foreign Legion. The 
senior officers that are members of the promotion boards will likely view any job that 
was not KD when they were serving at their lower rank as a comparatively lesser 
position. This promotion process cannot self correct. The people who were promoted and 
now are members of promotion boards see nothing wrong with a system in which they 
were successful, so the likelihood of an officer or NCO serving with an American 
Foreign Legion being promoted fairly is minimal. This shortcoming is nothing new in the 
U.S. Army, but the issue may be magnified with the creation of an American Foreign 
Legion. 
The United States Army could assign leadership to a Foreign Legion without 
significant issue. However, if the Army did not support the establishment of an AFL, the 
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bureaucratic nature of the Army could make manning difficult and ensure personnel 
assigned were regularly passed over for promotions. If the senior leadership of the U.S. 
Army supported the establishment of an American Foreign Legion, the manning and 
personnel issues would not be a significant obstacle. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
There would be numerous tactical and operational advantages to establishing an 
American Foreign Legion. The most significant would be the ability to deploy American 
controlled forces for long durations to deal with low intensity conflicts. The infusion of 
cultural and linguistic experts, who are willing to serve in remote austere conditions for 
years, is likely the best tool in combating a world in which the primary method of warfare 
is regional insurgencies. The continuity of a Foreign Legion will allow military leaders to 
focus on long-term goals instead of short-term ones. If military leaders knew they were 
going to be deployed in an area indefinitely, the establishment of close ties with the local 
population would become immediately and critically important. This of course is the 
corner stone of any effective counterinsurgency. The realization that an individual unit 
can be held singularly responsible for all of the successes or failures in a given area will 
likely ensure the long term goals of security and stability will outweigh the short term 
goals of killing insurgents or disrupting networks.   
But these tactical advantages of creating an American Foreign Legion would be 
overshadowed by the huge strategic challenges that establishing an AFL would create. 
The biggest issue would be the appearance of imperialism. The “War of the Story” is 
being lost every day by America in the Muslim world, because the dominate narrative is 
the “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West that dates at least to the Christian 
Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula dating from the ninth century, through the Crusades, 
European imperialism, and finally the establishment and support by the United States of 
the State of Israel. American Forces are constantly outmaneuvered by our adversaries in 
the media, and regularly our Information Operations only manage to snatch defeat from 
the jaws of victory. The establishment of an American Foreign Legion would be shown 
throughout the world as another example of American imperialist intentions, realized 
through the recruitment of mercenary forces. Another obstacle that could indeed be 
insurmountable would be the negative reaction by some Americans to the idea of creating 
an American Foreign Legion. Americans have historically been an egalitarian society that 
offers opportunity to immigrants, who join the U.S. Army Forces as equals, not to 
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become part of a military ghetto. The very idea of using foreign mercenaries to fight our 
conflicts offends the core principles of many Americans. The nations that have created 
foreign legions—France and Spain—have different values, created them in the 
exceptional circumstances of imperial ventures, and have always included large numbers 
of their own nationals in their ranks. They stood out in the past because they were 
professional units in overwhelmingly conscript armies whose main task was homeland 
defense. Today, with the professionalization of all armies, the lack of a threat in Europe, 
and the inclusion of foreigners in the ranks of regular units in Spain in particular, they 
survive as historical and professional curiosities rather than as potent tools of power 
projection. Likewise, the two battalion strong Brigade of Gurkhas endures in the British 
Army as a colorful relic of empire. And while they have served in various British 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, they supplement, rather than substitute, 
for British forces. 
The strategic issues in creating an American Foreign Legion are compounded by 
the current economic and political conditions in the United States and particularly within 
the U.S. military. The current focus on the U.S. national debt and the recent indications 
from the Executive and the Legislative branches of the federal government indicate that 
within the next decade the defense budget will be reduced. It is unlikely the Department 
of Defense will create new organizations, while in the midst of downsizing. This coupled 
with a fairly week national economy and high unemployment would combine to make the 
replacement of military units manned by U.S. citizens with “foreign mercenaries” would 
be a controversial move.  
It is with all of these considerations in mind that the United States should not 
establish an American Foreign Legion at this time. There may come a time in the future 
where budgetary restrictions make a Foreign Legion a more viable option. But currently 
it is an ill-advised option, fraught with security risks, that would be difficult to justify 
domestically and internationally, that could make our current struggles with trans-
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